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HIST 383: History of Modern Iraq 






 The rhetoric of women’s rights has long been appropriated by men to justify their right to 
continue to hold power. In the imperial context of the United States, women in the Middle East 
are often portrayed as unilaterally oppressed, typically by Islamic principles, with the hijab and 
niqab as symbols of this oppression. Particularly in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
this rhetoric has become a common thread in American society; in 2004, Bush stated that "every 
woman in Iraq is better off because the rape rooms and torture chambers of Saddam Hussein are 
forever closed.”1 There has been a great deal of scholarly work since 2003 that challenges the 
notion that the invasion of Iraq served to liberate Iraqi women, but it is also worth analyzing the 
claims by the U.S. government that Saddam was inherently anti-woman or that the Ba‘th 
government policy towards women was one of active oppression. The Ba‘th regime did indeed 
make tangible moves towards more egalitarian gender relations in Iraqi society, particularly in 
education and the workforce. But the Ba‘th also created a violent security state that tortured and 
executed anyone suspected of opposing the regime (particularly communist opposition) and in no 
way discriminated between men and women. Both the Ba‘thi state and U.S. imperial forces used 
the rhetoric of liberation of women broadly defined, ignoring that the population of Iraqi women 
varied dramatically in their experiences of state and imperial violence. These two seemingly 
oppositional forces both fail to address the specific realities for Iraqi women in different contexts 
and the forces that created and exacerbated violence against women. One such force was the 
international sanctions placed on Iraq from August 1990 - May 2003, on which there has been 
little analysis relating specifically to women’s experiences. This essay analyzes the impacts of 
international sanctions on Iraqi women with regard to social and economic position and political 
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participation, as well as the way sanctions shaped both Ba‘thi and U.S. rhetoric. I argue that 
these sanctions effectively undermined the movement for Iraqi women’s liberation firstly by 
creating a more immediate economic concern to divert public attention from women’s 
oppression, and secondly by actively undoing the legal strides that had been made towards 
gender equity since 1968. 
 In discussing women’s rights in Iraq, it is critical to define the framework for this 
analysis. Chandra Mohanty writes of imperial feminist scholarship in which “the discursively 
consensual homogeneity of ‘women’ as a group is mistaken for the historically specific material 
reality of groups of women.”2 This homogeneity, she continues, is regularly used to prove that if 
one group of women is oppressed, then all women everywhere are oppressed. This essay, then, 
attempts to avoid this failure, recognizing that one population of women may be disadvantaged 
by policies and dynamics that benefit other women. This is true both between the women of 
different cultures and nation states, and within the population of Iraqi women specifically. Class, 
ethnicity, religion, and political party factors all create layers to the experience of Iraqi women 
under sanctions. As much as space and research materials allow, I will attempt to incorporate an 
intersectional analysis that constructs Iraqi women as having agency, and not as passive victims 
of the regime, Iraqi men, or American imperialism. With this in mind, the primary works that 
this essay draws on are case studies that highlight the specificities of Iraqi women’s experiences 
under sanctions through their own voices.  
 The physical toll of sanctions on the Iraqi population has been understood for many 
years. Madeleine Albright infamously stated in 1996 that she believed that the deaths of half a 
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million Iraqi children under sanctions were “worth it.”3 Given the horrific impact on the lives of 
all Iraqis, there has been little analysis of the ways in which sanctions impacted women 
specifically. The effects of sanctions on women were certainly related to the shifting economic 
reality for men; for example, while there were few jobs available for anyone, those jobs that did 
arise were more likely to be taken by men. Women were discouraged from working both by 
changing social dynamics and by the elimination of government programs that had allowed 
women to work in the public sphere. Socially, the role of women became “umm bait muhtarama, 
the respectable housewife;” this is contrasted with images and rhetoric from the 1970s and 80s 
celebrating women workers, including Saddam’s speech in 1975 condemning the “bourgeois 
ideology which assumes that the first and last role of women is in the home.”4 Additionally, 
while men without work often found jobs peddling food or driving taxis, these jobs were 
typically considered unacceptable for women.5 On a national level, women were encouraged to 
resign or retire early and resignation was incentivized by the termination of government 
programs providing free childcare and public transportation. Women had been the primary 
recipients of the welfare state more broadly, and so were most affected by its collapse.6 With the 
collapse of the welfare state, along with an erosion of extended family and neighborhood 
networks, women were increasingly required to care for their own children and thus were unable 
to work in the public sphere. The sanctions reduced economic opportunities for everyone, but the 
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state and society worked to shift the loss of work onto women so as to preserve the opportunities 
for men, particularly by reducing state support for women workers.  
Iraqi women also experienced a decline in educational opportunities during sanctions. 
Prior to sanctions, Iraq’s education system was very advanced; education was mandatory from 
ages 6-12 for all children, and education was free at all levels. The regime also made major 
efforts to make education accessible for people of all socioeconomic backgrounds, and by 1990, 
female enrollment in secondary school increased to 38.5%.7 Women’s education was a key part 
of the state feminist rhetoric. In a 1971 speech, Saddam said “what a crime it would be against 
the younger generation if women were deprived of their rights to freedom, education, and full 
participation in… the community.”8 Indeed, women’s education has also been documented as 
improving fertility and reducing overall child mortality rates.9 However, under sanctions, female 
education declined sharply. By 2000, illiteracy rates among Iraqi women were at 71% for 
females age 15-24. Though primary education remained mandatory, statistics show that over 1.5 
million Iraqi girls eligible for primary school were not enrolled in the 2000-2001 school year. 
Female enrollment in secondary school dropped to 29%, lower than it had been in the 1970s.10 It 
is important to illustrate the class dynamics in this educational crisis. Though strides had been 
made to eliminate socioeconomic barriers to education in previous decades, much of this was 
reversed under sanctions. And although education remained technically free, certain school 
supplies were no longer covered and many families were unable to pay.11 Additionally, many 
young women were expected to make money for their families in the informal economy (often 
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through begging, theft, or sex work) and did not have time to attend school. Those that were able 
to attend school experienced increasingly unmaintained school facilities and increasingly 
underpaid teachers. The Iraqi blogger Riverbend wrote that science classes in the universities 
suffered because their materials were banned under the sanctions, and many textbooks were 
impossible to get as well.12 Whatever efforts had been made to make education accessible to all 
genders and classes were effectively reversed under sanctions.  
The family structure of Iraqi society and the role of women in the family were impacted 
not only by declining employment and educational opportunities, but also by the medical impacts 
of sanctions, including the deaths of children. This was particularly pronounced for lower class 
families, who were more likely to experience child mortality.13 However, women’s family role 
began to change significantly even prior to the imposition of international sanctions, during the 
Iran-Iraq war when the government outlawed contraceptives and emphasized the role of women 
in reproducing the Iraqi population to compensate for the massive death toll of the war. This ban 
on family planning continued into the sanctions period, but while women were still encouraged 
to have many children, there was a greater reluctance to have children for the fear that children 
would die or that they would be unable to feed them. Additionally, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf 
War, and the rise in economic migration of men created a large number of female-headed 
households, in Basra as high as 60%.14  As women were being encouraged to have more 
children, they were also increasingly the sole providers for these children in an economy where 
they were discouraged from working. Family dynamics also experienced a shift away from 
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broader family networks and towards the importance of the nuclear family.15 Here it is important 
to address that, though the nuclear family holds a particular importance in Western 
modernization, it should not be viewed as such in the Iraqi context. Indeed, in Iraq, the shift 
away from extended networks may have led to more oppressive patriarchal relations. Yasmin Al-
Jawaheri argues that women who lacked support from both the state and a broad family network 
under sanctions were further subordinated because they developed “high dependency ratio on a 
single male provider.”16 
Given the importance of support from a male provider for many women, marriage 
became increasingly important for young Iraqi women under sanctions, at the same time as it 
became harder to find a husband due to the gender imbalance in Iraq following the Iran-Iraq war. 
Hamdiya, a woman interviewed by al-Ali, stated that, whereas it had once been considered taboo 
to not get married or to enter a polygamous marriage, “among my generation, there are many 
women who either did not get married… or became the second wife of someone.”17 She also 
noted that many women married older expatriates. Polygamous marriages, which had been 
sharply reduced and condemned by the regime in previous eras, were revived in the 1990s. In a 
1976 address to the General Federation of Iraqi Women, Saddam had stated the importance of 
“strengthening and expanding the conditions which prohibit polygamy.”18 And yet under 
sanctions, polygamous marriages increased dramatically, largely out of economic necessity. The 
desirability of a husband was no longer based on love and family reputation, but instead based 
almost entirely on whether he could provide for his wife. As such, class dynamics of marriage 
also shifted. Increasingly, middle-class women from important families who had suffered under 
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sanctions came to marry nouveau riche sanctions profiteers, primarily Oil-for-Food contractors 
and oil smugglers, despite the fact that marriage below one’s family status had previously been 
very uncommon.19 This indicates that money came to surpass family name in determining social 
status. However, the limited number of husbands who could provide economic protection also 
meant that many lower class women were either not able to marry as middle class women were, 
or were not able to use marriage as a source of economic protection. 
 Under sanctions, Iraq also saw a revival of “honor killings” and domestic violence. 
Economic crisis and war have been well documented as key contributors to gender-based 
violence. The revival of “honor killings” in Iraq occurred not only on a popular level under 
sanctions but was also supported by state legalization.  In 1990, Saddam issued a decree granting 
immunity to men accused of committing honor crimes (i.e. crimes against women suspected of 
having violated codes of social conduct.)20 Though this ruling was appealed two months later, 
this law seems to have somewhat legitimated honor crimes, as the UN tracked an increase in 
honor crimes during the 1990s compared to previous decades. It is unclear why this law was 
passed, though al-Jawaheri suggests that it was a tactic to gain the support of conservative tribal 
and religious leaders in preparation for the invasion of Kuwait.21 The desire by the regime to 
acquire the loyalty of tribal leaders continued during the sanctions period, and men who killed 
female relatives for the purpose of preserving family honor were regularly acquitted.22 The legal 
system clearly came to increasingly favor those who committed honor crimes rather than the 
victims of these crimes. 
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Related to the rise in honor crimes was the increased violence against those engaging in 
prostitution. This coincided with a rise in prostitution given the limited opportunities for women 
to make money under sanctions. Iraq saw, for the first time, the development of luxury brothels, 
the patrons of which were primarily sanctions profiteers and members of the regime. Sex work 
quickly became a critical source of income to many women.23 Given its complicity in the sex 
work sector, the regime initially supported, or at least failed to interfere in the rising industry. 
However, beginning in 2000, the regime reportedly beheaded more than 300 people accused of 
engaging in or facilitating sex work. There is a general consensus among historians that this 
attack on sex workers, like the legalization of honor crimes, was an effort by the regime to gain 
the favor of tribal and religious leaders in a period of increased social conservatism under 
sanctions.24 The sanctions contributed to both a rise in prostitution as a means of economic 
survival and a rise in social conservatism which punished women, violently, for acts of survival. 
In tracing gender-based violence, it is further important to highlight the differential 
impacts based on women’s class status. Nadje al-Ali writes that “for educated, middle-class 
women from urban areas, it was not so much honour crimes they feared as diminished marriage 
prospects.”25 It should be noted that violence against sex workers and women accused of 
violating honor codes impacted working-class women far more than middle or upper class 
women, in part because these women were more likely to be driven to sex work as a means of 
survival. Additionally, marriage was increasingly a means of economic and social protection, but 
it was deeply based in class dynamics and many middle-class women struggled to find husbands, 
making the marriage prospects for lower-class women even smaller. Violence against women in 
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the name of social conservatism most often impacted working-class women, who were also the 
greatest victims of sanctions more broadly. 
Honor killings were also particularly pronounced in Iraqi Kurdistan, and it is worth 
noting the particularity of the experience of Kurdish women under sanctions. The sanctions era 
in Kurdistan has been described as “double embargo” because of the impacts of both 
international sanctions and the refusal of the Iraqi central government to assist the Kurds, but 
Kurdistan also experienced a much higher rate of international aid than the rest of Iraq.26 
Additionally, the establishment of Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) allowed some regional 
autonomy, though this has done little to mediate Kurdish women’s liberation. Though there have 
been many women’s rights groups created in Kurdistan since the early 1990s, these groups 
depend on the KDP and PUK for their continued existence. Because these groups represent a 
wide range of perspectives on women’s rights, the KRG has made little headway in terms of 
improving the position of Kurdish women. One Kurdish activist fighting against honor killings in 
the 1990s stated that “both political parties, the PUK and the KDP, gave us a hard time. They 
really harassed us.”27 In relation to honor killings, the specific language of “honor” was removed 
from Kurdish law in 2002, but Kurdish women’s rights activists still report that these crimes go 
largely unpunished.28 Because Kurdistan operated under a semi-autonomous legal structure, the 
development of legal rights for women is different than in the rest of Iraq, but the sanctions 
period disadvantaged women in this region as well. Indeed, following the creation of the KRG 
and establishment of Kurdistan as a “safe haven,” Kurdish women saw an increase in instances 
                                               
26Nadje al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, What Kind of Liberation?: Women and the Occupation of Iraq, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009), 50. 
27al-Ali, Iraqi Women, 207. 
28Nadje al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, “Conspiracy of Near Silence: Violence Against Iraqi Women,” Middle 
East Report, no. 258 (2011): 36.  
 
10 
of domestic violence.29 It is worth noting that, while honor killings and other gender based 
violence increased during the sanctions period, they increased even further after the 2003 
invasion. In the sanctions period, the Iraqi government was actively allowing these crimes in 
order to maintain loyalty ties with tribal and religious leaders. In the post-invasion period, the 
increased sectarianization of rule (by U.S. occupation forces) and decentralization of power left 
tribal and religious leaders with greater control, further contributing to violence against women.  
Yet another critical impact of sanctions was on the political participation of Iraqi women. 
In this realm, it is critical to note that women’s political participation, like that of all Iraqi 
citizens, was severely limited throughout the Ba‘th era because Iraq was a one-party state. 
Information on the political participation of women outside the Ba‘th party (e.g. women in the 
Communist Party) is therefore limited because these groups were forced to hide their operations 
from the regime. However, the role of women in the Ba‘th party was a key point of Ba‘thi 
rhetoric, and the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) was the key state mechanism for 
mobilizing women. The GFIW, a prime example of state co-optation of feminist struggles, was, 
of course, only open to Ba‘thi women, but it was also a critical source of income for many 
women prior to sanctions. One employee, Soha, told al-Jawaheri that her salary was $320 USD 
per month prior to sanctions. However, during sanctions, her salary dropped to $3.50 USD and, 
as she said, “‘now’ there are a few women who gain from being employees here, while the rest 
get nothing.”30 The GFIW saw not a unilateral loss of benefits, but rather an increased 
stratification between the top ranking members and the larger base of employees. These leading 
members of the GFIW were, as al-Ali puts it “themselves part of oppressive political and social 
                                               
29al-Ali, Iraqi Women, 207. 
30al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 49. 
 
11 
structures.”31 The women who had used the GFIW to mobilize for legitimate social change were 
severely disadvantaged under sanctions.  
As is clear in the legalization of certain forms of violence against women, as well as the 
disincentivization of women joining the workforce, the regime played an active role in 
disadvantaging women and reversing legal progress made prior to the sanctions period. 
However, the regime also clearly denied culpability for women’s oppression, as is evident in the 
1998 report to the UN on Iraq’s progress on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This report, written by the regime, makes repeated 
reference to the sanctions, but uses the sanctions to justify why previous advancements for 
women were revoked. With regards to women in the workforce, the report states that “the 
difficult economic conditions created by the comprehensive embargo have also forced large 
numbers of Iraqi women to… devote themselves to domestic work.”32 This, of course, ignores 
that the regime was actively promoting the domestic role of women and removing social 
programs to encourage women’s work. In reference to childcare for women workers, which had 
previously been free, the report notes that the number of facilities actually increased from 1987-
1996, but ignores that the programs for subsidized childcare had ended under sanctions. The 
CEDAW report also claims, with regards to women’s political participation, that “any 
diminution in the role of women is due to the embargo and to their preoccupation with 
shouldering the burdens of the household.”33 This claim is clearly disingenuous given that the 
majority of women in the GFIW suffered economically while a select few profited under 
sanctions. The frequent mention of the sanctions in the report indicates the regime’s frustration 
                                               
31al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation?, 53. 
32“Second and Third Periodic Reports of Iraq on the Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination 




with the continued imposition of sanctions by the UN. But the sanctions were also clearly used 
as an excuse to pass off blame for the deteriorating position of Iraqi women to the international 
community, while the regime played an active role in reversing gender equity measures.  
 Just as the regime refused to accept responsibility for the damage done to women’s 
rights, so did the U.S. refuse to consider the gendered impact of sanctions. One of the U.S. 
government’s many disingenuous justifications for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was bringing “new 
rights and new hopes” to the women of Iraq.34 Setting aside the fact that the 2003 invasion had 
devastating effects on the entire Iraqi population, women included, and that it deepened many of 
the existing economic and social problems faced by Iraqi women, many of the losses in legal 
rights for Iraqi women were a direct result of sanctions imposed by the UN and maintained by 
the U.S. The U.S. government was well aware of the cost of sanctions on the Iraqi population, 
particularly the number of lives lost. And yet U.S. officials insisted for years, against the 
consensus of the UN, that sanctions would not be lifted unless Saddam was  removed from 
power. In 1997, Albright, then Secretary of State, said “We do not agree with those nations who 
argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, 
sanctions should be lifted,” despite the fact that the sanctions were specifically imposed to 
enforce the decommissioning of weapons of mass destruction.35 Though the regime initially 
cooperated with UNSCOM inspections, U.S. policy continued to hold Iraqi people hostage as a 
bargaining tool for regime change, a bargain which failed to motivate a dictator to sacrifice his 
own power. Iraqi women suffered as a direct result of these prolonged sanctions, and then their 
position was used to justify further imperialist ventures in 2003. For all the rhetoric of women’s 
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liberation, women were almost entirely absent from the provisional government following the 
2003 invasion and an increasingly tribalized legal system contributed to the further subordination 
of women’s rights.36 
 Both the Iraqi regime and the U.S. government denied their role in the reduction of rights 
for Iraqi women by passing off blame on the other party, a tactic applied not only in the 
conversation about women but more generally in the blame for the terrible cost of sanctions. 
While no party was willing to accept responsibility, women were being pushed out of the 
workforce, becoming increasingly dependent on husbands or male relatives, being encouraged to 
have children they could not support economically, experiencing drastic increases in gender-
based violence, and losing the economic benefits they had once been able to gain from party 
loyalty. Sanctions are often promoted as a better, non-violent alternative to war. But in the Iraqi 
case it is clear that sanctions, especially such tight and prolonged sanctions, were effectively a 
form of violence against the Iraqi people. Furthermore, the people who experience this economic 
violence most intensely are the most marginalized and dependent groups, including women, 
lower class people, and children, who, in Iraq and many other cases, were already victimized by 
the regime the sanctions purported to attack. In the U.S., the history of sanctions against Iraq has 
been almost totally erased from collective memory by the 2003 invasion, which certainly 
exacerbated much of the existing devastation that occurred in Iraq since 1990 at the hands of the 
U.S. government. But it is critical to recognize sanctions as a form of imperialist policy and to 
recognize the violence of prolonged sanctions; we must be critical of the use of sanctions as an 
alternative to war in past and future international conflicts. 
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